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q .S. Lewis' concern for the abuse of animals in scientific experimentation, as treated in That Hideous Strength, 
will be familiar to many readers of this journal. W hat some 
readers will not be so sure about though, I suspect, will be 
the proposition that this concern of Lewis' can be seen to 
owe a great deal to his interest in evolutionary theory. It is 
my intention in this article to substantiate this proposition, 
utilizing both Lewis' writing and that of authors to whom 
he acknowledges an intellectual debt. I will also refer to 
some of the more recent scholarship on Lewis and the 
views of some other writers concerning vivisection.
In That Hideous Strength, the third volume in Lewis' 
science fiction trilogy, readers will know, the N.I.C.E. —  
the National Institute of Co-ordinated Experiments — 
were engaged in "an immense programme of vivisection, 
freed at last from Red Tape and from niggling economy" 
(THS, 102). Mark Studdock became aware of this when he 
happened to wander into the vicinity of some new build­
ings at the back of the Belbury mansion, from which 
emanated "a mixture of animal and chemical smells":
As he stood there a loud melancholy howl arose and 
then, as if it had set the key, all manner of trumpetings, 
baying, screams, laughter even, which shuddered and 
protested for a moment and then died away into mut- 
terings and moans.... There were all sorts of things in 
there: thousands of pounds worth of living animality, 
which the Institute could afford to cut up like paper on 
the mere chance of some interesting discovery (THS, 
102,162).
Interestingly, it is precisely this last point —  experimenta­
tion on animals simply out of curiosity, or perhaps primar­
ily to satisfy the self-serving interests of experimenters — 
that animal welfare groups such as the RSPCA (Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) currently 
find most objectionable, as was expressed last year by Dr. 
Hugh Worth, President of the RSPCA in Victoria, Australia: 
[Worth says] the RSPCA draws the line at pure 
research, the "w hat if? stuff," where procedures are 
carried out without definite conclusions: "W e im­
mediately clash with pure scientists or those psy­
chologists, who are worse, designing these little 
experiments that have no obvious end point, no 
obvious expected retrieval of information.... All 
these clowns get all sorts of Ph.D. titles. You wonder 
why they even want to do it. It's all bulldust stuff."1 
As an example of the kind of thing Lewis perhaps had 
in mind in his day, one could cite Lancelot Hogben's 
Science for the Citizen, originally published in the 1940s, 
which, in a section titled "The Conquest of Behaviour,"
describes experiments which can be carried out on various 
species to demonstrate "reactivity." Thus "suitable stimu­
lation" of the "anal orifice.... by a succession of electric 
shocks" will cause changes in a cham eleon's coloration; 
snipping the spinal cord with a pair of dissecting scissors, 
however, will result in the animal only showing these 
changes in the part of the body posterior to the cu t (extraor­
dinary!). This experiment is described as an illustration of 
what is involved in "controlling" an animal.2 The philos­
ophy of Science for the Citizen is neatly summarized in the 
opening paragraph of a chapter toward the end of the book 
titled "A Planned Ecology of Hum an Life":
Evolution unfolds a new horizon of human destiny. 
Man has it in his power to become an active and intel­
ligent directive agent in the evolutionary process, using 
his knowledge of the diversity of living creatures to 
decide which are essential to his own welfare as objects 
of use... and using his knowledge of the properties of 
living matter to adjust the environment of the species 
he chooses as members of a rationally planned ecolog­
ical system.3
All this sounds very like Lord Feverstone's explanation of 
the N.I.C.E/S objectives to M ark Studdock:
The second problem is our rivals on this planet. I don't 
mean only insects and bacteria. There's far too much 
life of every kind about, animal and vegetable. We 
haven't really cleared the place yet. First we couldn't; 
and then we had aesthetic and humanitarian scruples; 
and we still haven't short-circuited the question of the 
balance of nature. All that is to be gone into (THS, 42). 
Or, as neatly encapsulated in C o sse ts remark to Studdock 
as they arrived at the village of C ure Hardy for Cesser's 
(for whom "statistics about agricultural labourers were the 
substance; any real ditcher, ploughman, or farmer's boy 
the shadow") sociological investigations: "Bloody awful 
noise those birds make" (THS, 87).
Yet, as I've indicated, it can be argued that it was Lewis' 
interest in evolution that can partly account for his objec­
tions to animal experimentation. How can this be?
To begin with, a widely held misconception about 
Lewis —  repeated, unfortunately, in A.N. W ilson's recent 
biography —  needs to be dispelled; and that is the notion 
that Lewis, once he became a Christian, rejected evolution. 
In his essay "The Funeral of a Great M yth," written about 
1945 (that is, a number of years after his conversion to 
Christianity), Lewis says quite unambiguously:
I do not mean that the doctrine of Evolution as held by 
practising biologists is a myth. It may be shown by 
later biologists to be a less satisfying hypothesis than
we hoped fifty years ago. But that does not amount to 
being a Myth. It is a genuine scientific hypothesis. But 
we must sharply distinguish between Evolution as a 
biological theorem and popular Evolutionism or 
Developmentalism, which is certainly a Myth (CR, 83).
By "Evolutionism ," Lewis goes on to explain, he meant not 
a scientific theory but a philosophical position, as repre­
sented in the writings of Henri Bergson for example, and 
which held that the cosm os was inevitably moving "on­
wards and upw ards" to some kind o f perfect state —  an 
idea that no evolutionary scientist would subscribe to. 
(There is no certain d irection in D arwinian evolution, en­
vironmental changes are just as random and unpredictable 
as the genetic mutations which have been favored by 
them; degeneracy" can be a feature o f biological change 
just as increasing com plexity —  in the Tielhardian sense 
—  can be.) Lewis goes on to say:
Popular evolutionism or Developmentalism differs in 
content [Lewis' emphasis] from the Evolution of real 
biologists. To the biologist Evolution is a hypothesis at 
present on the market and is therefore to be accepted 
unless, or until, some new supposal can be shown to 
cover still more facts with even fewer assumptions 
(CR, 85).
That is about as admirable a sum mary of the currently 
most widely accepted working philosophy of science —  
that of Sir Karl Popper —  as one could wish for: the idea 
that any scientific theory is always open to question in the 
light of new evidence, and no genuine scientist interested 
in such matters (w hich o f course is by no means all) would 
ask for more. Again, in "M odern M an and his Categories 
o f T h o u g h t,"  w r itte n  in  1946, L ew is say s: "W ith  
Darwinianism as the theorem in Biology I do not think a 
Christian need have any quarrel" (PC, 63).
Someone as intelligent as Lewis, and with the wide 
interests he had, could not but help take the findings of 
science seriously. That he was interested in science is evi­
dent enough not only in the knowledge of science he 
displays in his science fiction trilogy (as well as in such 
collections of essays as Of This and Other Worlds and Present 
Concerns), but it is also apparent in the numerous refer­
ences that Lewis makes to his scientific reading in his now 
published Diary and Letters, and also in Surprised by Joy. As 
one of Lewis' biographers, A.N. W ilson, quotes William 
Epsom, who knew Lewis, Lewis was one who "read ev­
erything and remem bered everything he read."4 Among 
the authors whose works Lewis indicated he had read 
were Darwin and the other Nineteenth-century scientists 
T.H. Huxley, W illiam Clifford and Sir John Lobbock (SBJ, 
43; Letters, 227), Sir James Frazer (The Golden Bough —  an 
anthropological work [Diary, 351]), S.H. Rivers (Instincts 
and the Unconscious, which Lewis read with "great interest" 
[Diary, 67], J.B.S. Haldane (CR, 85), and L.T. Hobhouse, 
author of Mind in Evolution, and who Lewis described in 
1926 as "a man after my own heart" (Diary, 354). Lewis was 
also, of course, very aware of the second-hand versions of science 
in writers like Wells, Beigson, and to a lesser extent, Shaw.
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But Lewis did not just read books. If there was one thing 
he enjoyed even more than sitting around in a smoke-filled 
pub with his brother W am ie, it was ram bling in the sur­
rounding countryside. M oreover he was a keen and care­
ful observer of nature. An entry in his Diary for 27 June 
1923, for instance, reads:
I walked nearly to Dorset Hill by the field path and 
then turned into the road and left it again at the stile 
on my right beyond the turn to Forest Hill.... then up 
by the side of a spinney through a field alive with 
rabbits, most of them mere babies who let me get quite 
close to them. Of the full grown ones I was amused to 
notice how some would always sit out and face me a 
good minute after the commonality had galloped into 
the spinney.... (Diary, 248).
There is good evidence, too, that these observations were 
through Darwinian spectacles. In 1925, during a ramble on 
Exmoor with Maureen Moore (who was a child at the time, 
living with her mother and Lewis) Lewis recorded the 
following:
We.... struck left till we reached a green gully about 
four feet deep and running quite straight down the 
hillside. After a few yards descent it developed, as I 
had expected, into a stream, where we picked our way 
from stone to stone laboriously. We found plenty of 
frog spawn and some red mosses...
Maureen, apropos of something, asked me if the evo­
lutionary theory meant that we had come from monkeys.
I explained what it really meant. She asked me where 
Adam and Eve came in. I explained the Biblical and 
scientific accounts were alternatives. She asked me which 
I believed. I said the scientific (Diary, 361).
And that this interest in science, nature and evolution 
was not restricted to his pre-Christian period (i.e. pre-1929) 
is clear also from, for example, a letter he wrote to Dom 
Bede Griffiths in 1952:
By the way do read K.Z. Lorenz [sic] King Solomon's 
Ring on animal —  especially b ird — behaviour. There 
are instincts I never dreamed of: big with promise of 
real morality. The wolf is a v. different creature from 
what we imagine (Letters, 422).
In C.S. Lewis: A Biography, A N . W ilson writes at one 
point that the "crude Darwinian view of human conscious­
ness.... was that it had som ehow or other" evolved "from  
a succession of increasingly intelligent apes, beginning 
with a creature who little thought beyond where his next 
banana was com ing from, and culm inating in the Presi­
dent of the Royal Society," and that "This was only a 
theory and not, on the face o f it, a particularly probable 
one."5 Wilson implies that Lewis w ould have rejected any 
such idea out of hand (presented in this caricature form he 
very likely would have), but W ilson nowhere cites Lewis 
in writing as definitely having done so, and as we will see, 
Lewis remained at least equivocal on the subject. More 
than this, it was Lewis' interest in the evolution of con­
sciousness, specifically, that partly explains his strong feel­
ings about experimentation with animals. To see how this
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was so, it is worth looking for a moment at this book, King 
Solomon's Ring, that Lewis commended to Bede Griffiths.
W hat Lewis is referring to in wolves is presumably 
those qualities o f co-operative behavior and mutual assis­
tance in the pack that Lorenz describes in some detail 
(albeit in populist, anthropomorphic language):
In the life of a wolf, the community of the pack plays a 
vastly more important role than in that of the jackal. 
While the latter is essentially a solitary hunter and con­
fines himself to a limited territory, the wolf packs roam 
far and wide through the forests of the North as a sworn 
and very exclusive band which sticks together through 
thick and thin and whose members will defend each 
other to the very death.6
Although Lorenz does not fully spell out a Darwinian 
explanation for this kind of behavior in the volume in 
question (he does so elsewhere7), Lewis was certainly 
aware of such an explanation, as will be demonstrated 
shortly in another extract from That Hideous Strength. An 
explanation is provided by Hobhouse —  the author Lewis 
described as "as man after my own heart" —  in Mind in 
Evolution:
The higher animals lead a social life, not only in the sense 
that they congregate together like swarms of gnats or 
shoals of fish, but in the sense that they have sotial or 
family relations with one another. In these relations, acts 
of mutual help or forbearance are involved, and it is out 
of acts of mutual help and forbearance that morality as 
we know it among men is built up.8 
W hat Hobhouse is saying, first of all, is that such 
behaviors would be selected for (in natural selection terms) 
in so far as they increased the survival prospects of the 
group (e.g. a wolf pack) as a whole. A social species whose 
members came to one another's aid (or distracted attention 
from vulnerable members of the group, such as juveniles, 
as Lewis observed with the rabbits) would be at an advan­
tage in the struggle for existence. Such behavior, in turn, 
Hobhouse argued, probably depends upon feelings of 
"affinity" for other members of a troop, pack or whatever, 
and it is these feelings (or instincts) which lay at the basis 
of moral behavior— concern for the welfare of our fellows 
—  in humans. Hobhouse goes on to express this concept 
in Mind in Evolution in these terms:
What is clear is that in following out these instincts the 
animal is acting as part of a whole, as a member of a 
species. He is stimulated by his affinity to another 
individual, and his actions are of service to individuals 
that come after him.... Human morality rests on the 
same fundamental conditions at a higher stage of de­
velopment. Our common human nature is the ultimate 
basis of moral conceptions.9
Hobhouse's idea that such instincts lie at the basis of 
human morality sound very much like Lewis' remark to 
Dom Bede Griffiths about certain instincts in social 
animals like wolves and some birds being "big with a 
promise of real morality." But whether Lewis would have
so easily made the quantum leap from these species to 
humans that Hobhouse makes is quite another matter; one 
would surely have to say probably not (especially when 
one considers Lewis' discussion of "instinct" in The Aboli­
tion of Man [24-6]). There is a vast difference between 
human reasoning capacity and that of any other species 
we know of that the traditional separation of the "hum an­
ities" from natural science is, at least in terms of our 
present state of knowledge, fully justified, as Allan Bloom 
has so forcefully argued. Nevertheless, there have been 
variously cogent attempts to incorporate human reason 
into naturalistic explanations, and o f these perhaps the 
most persuasive have been those of Charles Darwin him­
self. In a chapter on "The Moral Sense" in The Descent of 
Man, Darwin discusses the concept of the evolution of 
human morality from the social instincts of 'Tower" (from 
the Victorian scala natura idea) animals; but where his 
discussion differs from H obhouse's is in the much greater 
place that Darwin allows for the role of human reason. 
Darwin writes as follows:
The social animals which stand at the bottom of the 
scale are guided almost exclusively, and those which 
stand higher in the scale are largely guided, by special 
instincts in the aid which they give to the members of 
the same community; but they are likewise in part 
impelled by mutual love and sympathy, assisted appar­
ently by some amount of reason. Although man.... has 
no special instincts to tell him how to aid his fellow men, 
he still has the impulse, and with his improved intellec­
tual faculties would naturally be much guided in this 
respect by reason and experience [my emphasis]."11
Furthermore, for Darwin, it is our reason that makes it 
possible for our natural, instinctive feelings of "sympathy" 
towards members of our ow n im mediate social groups to 
be extended towards ever-widening groups o f our own 
species, and ultimately toward other species:
As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are 
united into larger communities, the simplest reason 
would tell each individual that he ought to extend his 
social instincts and sympathies to all members of the 
same nation, though personally unknown to him. This 
point being once reached, there is only an artificial 
barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the men 
of all nations and races....
Sympathy beyond the confines of man, this is human­
ity to the lower animals, seems to be one of the latest moral 
acquisitions [the RSPCA and Anti-Vivisectionist Society 
had only been recently founded in England at Darwin's 
timeing of writing]... This virtue, one of the noblest with 
which man is endowed, seems to arrive incidentally from 
our sympathies becoming more tender and more widely 
diffused, until they are extended to all sentient beings.
Here, then, is a powerful argument upon w hich Lewis 
could base his case for objection to animal experimenta­
tion: the fact that other animals are in some sense like us, 
and are therefore at least entitled to our sympathies on that 
account —  an argument based on reason as much as
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feeling, but in which fellow-feeling, a product of evolution, 
nevertheless plays a major part.
This last elem ent, the evolutionary factor which ex­
presses itself in "sym pathy," and to which Hobhouse con­
siders the origins of human morality can be traced, may 
also be som etim es visible, according to Darwin, in non­
human animals exhibiting these feelings towards members 
of other than their own species. In his chapter on "The 
Moral Sense," Darwin has this story:
Several years ago a keeper at the Zoological Gardens 
showed me some deep and scarcely healed wounds on 
the nape of his own neck, inflicted on him, whilst 
kneeling on the floor, by a fierce baboon. The little 
American monkey, who was a warm friend of the 
keeper, lived in the same large compartment, and was 
dreadfully afraid of the great baboon. Nevertheless, as 
soon as he saw his friend in peril, he rushed to the 
rescue, and by screams and bites so distracted the 
baboon that the man was able to escape, after, as the 
surgeon thought, running great risk to his life.13
D a rw in 's  s to ry  w as e n th u s ia s tica lly  rep eated  by 
Hobhouse, and also by Rev. Charles Kingsley, author of 
The Water Babies ("on the strength of that same elem ent of 
self-sacrifice, I will not grudge the epithet 'heroic', which 
my reverend friend Mr. Darwin justly applied to [that] 
poor little m onkey"14), and it is fair to assume that Lewis 
would have read it in at least one of these authors (we 
know he read Kingsley [Letters, 504]), if not in Darwin. But 
there is good reason to think that Lewis also read the story 
first-hand in Darwin. On the same page in Descent of Man 
on which he has the story, Darwin also says: "I have myself 
seen a dog, who never passed a cat who lay sick in a basket, 
and was a great friend of his, without giving her a few licks 
with his tongue, the surest sign of kind feeling in a dog."1 
This sounds something like the following episode in That 
Hideous Strength, where Lewis describes the relationship 
of Mr. Bultitude and Pinch:
'What friends those two are!' said Ivy Maggs. She was 
referring to Pinch the cat and Mr. Bultitude the bear. 
The latter was sitting up with his back against the 
warm wall by the kitchen fire....
The cat, after walking to and fro with erect tail and 
rubbing herself against his belly, had finally curled up 
and gone to sleep between his legs....
'When we use the word, Friends, of those two 
creatures', said MacPhee, 1 doubt we are being merely 
anthropomorphic. It is difficult to avoid the illusion that 
they have personalities in the human sense. But there's no 
evidence for it'....
What do you think, Sir?' said Ivy, looking at the 
Director.
'Me?' said Ransom. 1 think MacPhee is introducing 
into animal life a distinction that doesn't exist there, and 
then trying to determine on which side of that distinction 
the feeling of Pinch and Bultitude fall. You've got to 
become human before the physical cravings are distin­
guishable from affections.... What is going on in the cat
and the bear isn't one or other of those two things: it is a 
single undifferentiated thing in which you can find the 
germ of what we call friendship and of what we call 
physical need' (THS, 260-1).
This "germ of what we call friendship" is presumingly 
meant in some kind of evolutionary sense, and it is easy to 
see how Lewis could conceive of this being connected with 
the question of kindliness of one species toward another the 
very antithesis of self-centeredness, and surely having some­
thing to do with morality. The role of feeling, of sentiment, 
in the repugnance that Lewis felt towards animal experimen­
tation was well expressed in his Diary, where he recorded 
how his Aunt Lily, an anti-vivisectionist (who was also 
interested in Mendelian theory), in November 1922 
Told me a very disgusting story of how medical stu­
dents here in Oxford, who she had seen dragging off 
a dog into the laboratories [and who] were laughing 
together as they talked of the old man who had sold it 
making them promise to give it a good home and be 
kind to it (Diary, 143).
Lewis added, presumably at a later date: "after that I no 
longer defended Oxford again or ever shall."
But the importance of reasoned argument —  of which 
humans, unlike other species, are also capable —  in our 
relationship with the other creatures was also recognized 
by Lewis. And it is interesting to see that Lewis based such 
arguments on a Darwinian understanding of the relative 
development of "consciousness" in various species also, 
especially in his essay "V ivisection" and in the chapter 
"Animal Pain" in The Problem o f Pain —  both written long 
after Lewis' conversion to Christianity. Kath Film er has 
recently argued that the consistency of themes and images 
in Lewis' work reveals no marked change or repudiation 
by the later Lewis of his early world view, and she 
specifically takes this back to his Oxford student years. 
However this may be in other areas of Lewis' thinking, it 
would certainly seem to apply in his attitude toward evo­
lution. W hatever his Christian convictions in  the matter, 
Lewis' objections to animal suffering at the hands of hu­
mans were at least reinforced by persuasive evolutionary 
arguments, as is clear in this passage from The Problem of 
Pain:
Clearly in some way the ape and man are much more 
like each other that either is like a worm. At the lower 
end of the animal realm we need not assume anything 
we could not recognize as sentience. Biologists in dis­
tinguishing animal from vegetable do not make use of 
sentience or locomotion or other such characteristics 
as a layman would naturally fix upon. At some point, 
however (though where, we cannot say), sentience 
almost certainly comes in, for the high animals have 
nervous systems very like our own (PP, 119).
And Lewis did notbalk at taking such observations to their 
logical conclusion:
It is certainly difficult to suppose that the apes, the
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elephant, and the higher domestic animals have not, in 
some degree, a self or soul which connects experiences 
and gives rise to rudimentary individuality (PP, 121).
Darwin's scala natura idea strongly informs both these 
excerpts: animals "higher" in the scale of being are more 
like us, and therefore presumably more likely to feel pain 
in something approaching the way we do. The same con­
cept lies behind Lewis' account, in Perelandra, of Ransom's 
discovery of a frog-like creature that had been mutilated 
by the depraved scientist, Professor Weston:
The thing itself was an intolerable obscenity. It 
would have been better, or so he thought at the 
moment, for the whole universe never to have 
existed than for this one thing to have happened. 
Then he decided, in spite of his theoretical belief 
that it was an organism too low for much pain, that 
it better be killed. He had neither boots nor stone 
nor stick. The frog proved remarkably hard to kill. 
When it was far too late to desist he saw clearly that 
he had been a fool to make the attempt. Whatever 
its sufferings might be he had to go through with 
it. The job seemed to take nearly an hour. And 
when at last the mangled result was quite still and 
he went down to the water's edge to wash, he was 
sick and shaken (Perelandra, 109).
So, if non-human animals feel pain something like we 
do because they have nervous systems like ours, and this 
is because they are related to us in the evolutionary sense, 
then it is only reasonable that we should consider their 
feelings just as we believe we should consider the feelings 
of other humans in accordance with the Golden Rule — 
Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.17 As 
the case was admirably put in a recent letter to New Scien­
tist in connection with an on-going debate in that journal 
on animal experimentation:
An ethics based on kinship with other animals as­
sumes nothing more than the unemotional, rational 
realization than many species suffer pain. If it was 
wrong to inflict pain on humans whatever their mental 
abilities, then it must be wrong to inflict pain on non­
human animals."18
This was precisely  the argum ent used by Lewis in 
"Vivisection":
The very same people who will most contemptuously 
brush aside any consideration of animal suffering if it 
stands in the way of 'research' will also, in another 
context, most vehemently deny that there is any rad­
ical difference between man and the other animals....
If we cut up beasts simply because they cannot prevent 
us and because we are backing our own side in the 
struggle for existence, it is only logical to cut up imbe­
ciles, criminals, enemies.... for the same reasons (GTD, 
226-7).
If it is wrong to experiment on the latter, so it is with the 
former.
Lewis was not anti-science. As I have tried to show, it 
can be argued that it was partly his interest in science 
which accounts for his objection to animal experimenta­
tion. Michael Aeschliman has argued that for Lewis nature 
was "both real and good,"19 and indeed, in That Hideous 
Strength Lewis, as narrator, reassures readers that "the 
physical sciences" were both "good and innocent in them­
selves" (THS, 203). Science, ideally, is motivated by a love 
of truth, and about this Lewis could have had no com­
plaint. Trouble enters in however when, as Kathryn 
Lindskoog and Gracia Fay Ellwood so well explain, 
science becomes m erely a tool in the hands of self-serving 
practitioners motivated primarily by love of power.20 To 
Lewis such a misuse is a distortion of truth, a perversion 
of (as Aeschliman puts it) "The elementary 'natural' 
tendency with which every human creature [is] endowed 
—  to live happily and considerately —  happily because 
considerately —  in community with is fellows. 1 But the 
last word on the subject should be by Lewis:
The regenerate science which I have in mind would 
not do even to minerals and vegetables what modem 
science threatens to do to man himself. When it ex­
plained it would not explain away. When it spoke of 
the parts it would remember the whole. While study­
ing the It it would remember what Martin Buber calls 
the TTiow-situation. The analogy between the Tao of 
Man and the instincts of an animal species would mean 
for it new light cast on the unknown thing. Instinct, by 
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Joe Christopher has called me to note that 1993 is the 100th 
anniversary of the birth of Dorothy L. Sayers. He suggests 
that there be a special issue of Mythlore later in 1993 to honor 
her. Due to her friendship with the Inklings and the affinity 
of her world-view with theirs, I would be most pleased to 
see such an issue, featuring several articles in her honor, pro­
vided they are submitted. — Glen GoodKnight
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of rich treasures awaiting you in the
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